MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION
U.S. Naval War College

Ms. Coll. 17

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Papers: notes, etc., for naval strategy lectures. [1907-1911]

71-4

Vol. 13

Data for Naval Strategy Lectures

Strategical Conditions should determine Composition of the Fleet

Among the complex problems which the idea of Strategy gives rise, there is none more important than the constitution of the Fleet;

It therefore goes without saying that every project which fails to take account of the foreign relations of a great nation, or, of the material limits fixed by its resources, rests upon a basis which is both weak and unstable

Darrieus. p. 102

Necessary Dependence of Strategy on Policy

Foreign Policy is the inspiring cause of Strategy Indeed, Strategy, with the operations which it entails, is so closely tied to Policy, that it is not possible to sketch a plan of war, without a perfect (clear) knowledge of political objectives, of ends pursued, of possible alliances {Foreign Policy and Strategy are bound together by an indestructible link p. 109

Ibid 108

The Method of Using History for Instruction

To prevent historical study from being sterile, it is necessary to sum up the conclusions gradually reached [i.e. formulate them into doctrines] and so to provide ourselves with a compact vade mecum of the small number of doctrines which the sequence of events shall not have invalidated [Journal of Artillery]

Upon this follows the application of these teachings [thus formulated] to existing navies [naval problems of to day] in whatever nation

Ibid

Darrieus

Coast Defence and Strategy

Coast Defence, involving protection of the resources of the Country, and so being a special case of the general defensive problem, is one of the most important branches of Strategy.

Its importance derives not merely from the purely military side of securing naval bases — Strength — but from the equally military, though more remotely strategical, necessity of conserving resources.

Darrieus p. 115

National Conditions

Strategy and Tactics should be national; i.e. correspond to national conditions. Von der Goltz 117

After demonstrating the supremacy of the Sea from the case of the Hunascar, calling attention incidentally to the fact that the ship, though reduced to powerlessness, still floated and was soon repaired for service, Darrieus comments.

The lessons of History are not measured by the stature of its events; small may afford suggestion equal to that of great 190

Incontestable Effect of Ideas upon Action

Every military action, small or great [right or wrong] is the enforced consequence of a controlling thought, of a general plan [or Cast of idea] aiming at a definite Object; it necessarily derives from strategy either good or bad.

That is why the analysis of every war campaign reveals a lesson [prompting imitation or avoidance]

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Necessity of clear Idea

This lesson may be the result of an absence of a supreme controlling idea, manifested in a course of action lacking in accurate direction and sustained power

Ibid

Ships may be subdued without being sunk

After Punta Angamos, Yáñez reminds us that to reduce a war ship we are not necessarily limited to attacking her water line. The limit of capacity to resist, of the personnel, can be reached without destroying the buoyancy.

Like the Huascar, the Chen-Yuen and the Ting Yuen, without guns and fighting against guns, yielded to the effects of gunfire against the upper works

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Revised, if not written, before Tsushima, this does not mention the effect of shells which explode but do not penetrate

Success will result from having a directing principle, a plan of operations, as opposed to absence of initial conceptions and reliance upon luck

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Corbett + Mahan

In his account of the War of the League of Augsburg, Corbett, I may apprehension in complements my own; but in so doing it appears to me that interest in his particular subject — the Med.n — he exaggerates the perception of William III

The King seems to me to have taken indeed a great step, worthy to be commemorated, in deciding to keep the great fleet away from England during the winter months of ~~16~~ 1694-5, and 1695-6. Great because of the opposition of the sea officers on professional grounds; great also because to a certain extent it uncovered the Channel.

But, his decision proceeded from a prior act of Louis XIV, in moving the French fleet to the Mediterranean, with the object of supporting thereby operations against Spain — Catalonia — and Savoy. This move of the French fleet necessitated the movement of the British Great Fleet, under Russell; it also permitted the transfer because it removed the threat to the Channel. The effect of the move also was signalized by the successful French advance along the Catalan coast; which in the inefficiency could only be stopped by the allied fleet driving away the French

To get the great ships safely to British ports before the violent season, it appears to have been thought necessary to leave the Catalan coast early in August — at latest. This of course gave the Toulon fleet two months freedom to support the army, and a similar interval at the opening of operations in the spring. William's decision had the great merit that by keeping the allied fleet in Cadiz for the winter it could remain near Barcelona till the end of September, & perhaps later — especially at Alicante, a friendly port; and moreover it was a perpetual threat should the French fleet come out. Even from Cadiz it exerted this influence; for under Tourville's advice Louis's policy for the fleet was a strict defensive. It was not to fight but to watch; because it was inferior; and this inferiority was the result of the general French policy emphasized at La Hogue, a lesson which kept Louis at Tourville's feet ever after.

Louis's object in the Catalan operations — and also in Piedmont — had been to force Savoy and Spain to peace, thus releasing his armies in those quarters to the operations on his Eastern frontier — Germany and Holland. This was defeated by William's counter move; but

Naval Strategy

in general idea this was so obvious that it seems does scarcely to have claim to originality. I shall more of this in the Trench; for they first moved their great fleet to Toulon. But, having done so, and quickly, they immediately had to feel the effect of the mistake by which they had allowed their sea power to decline. What William did was the absolutely evident counter move, especially as he had great superiority of naval force. His excellence is in the moral force that carried into execution a great idea against professional prepossession and real risk.

- Got there first; but not with enough men

As soon as Louis found himself thus foiled, he resorted to the appropriate method of relieving the new pressure. ~~Availing himself of the opportunity offered by either mismanagement of the allies, & their mishap he shifted his fleet back to Brest~~ He made a very serious demonstration of collecting troops on the Channel shore for invasion of England. The consternation the English have ever felt at such a threat led to an immediate withdrawal of the allied fleet from the Mediterranean; and before new arrangements (dispositions) could be made Tourville's fleet slipped

out from Toulon and joined Brest without being intercepted. This fixed naval center of danger to at Channel.

The consecutive failure of France in this war was due to misuse of a sea power, or rather of a navy, which at the moment of outbreak was superior. The misuse was double. William not only was allowed to land in England, but was allowed to consolidate the "base" of his power by reducing Ireland; and then permitted to develop his superior naval force. He thus joined position, strength and resources.

The English fleet rather followed the movements of the French than originated a policy

Corbett's Seven Years War

The function of the Fleet upon which Corbett lays such stress as being distinct from Naval Strategy is the same as the function of Sea Power used by me in the last Chap. of French Rev: Empire

So also I had anticipated his remarks on the bearing of diplomatic and marching considerations on naval strategy, the interrelations of the three, in my discussion of "British Policy" in the same chapter.

I had derived from Jomini the formal recognition and appreciation of the fact that marching considerations cannot be severed from political

Corbett's England in Mediterranean

To summarize my immediate impressions, after reading Corbett concerning the War of the Spanish Succession, — in connection with my own Sea Power 1660-1783, — I should say that the he demonstrates what I had overlooked that the effect of Sea Power, in general, (we do not differ as to details materially), was to settle European conditions, European balance of power, by establishing British naval power in strong Mediterranean positions with consequent influence upon the States, — France, Spain, Savoy, and the Italian states — bordering the Med.n. Turkey of course felt the same influence; in less degree because more remote from the new British bases.

Lapeyrouse-Bonfils does indeed point out the bearing of Port Mahon upon Toulon; as I myself that of San Francisco in the late hostilities. I have recognized these strategic results and their bearings; and it would be more precise to say that I had not justly appreciated that the War of Span. Succ.n was as it were the prelude to the great Colonial Wars, because it settled a European balance by lowering France, strengthening England and in measure Austria in Europe. This balance consisted largely in the development of the British navy, in numbers and

bases, and the consequent enhancement of British commerce and its dependent finance.

Corbett's strong point, which so far as I now see he makes good, is that the establishment of this balance was not merely the result of this War. It was the outcome of the strategic purpose of Marlborough; by him derived from William III by the process noted in preceding pages. The effect of the presence of the British fleet in the Med.n had been noted and appreciated by the King. From this perception derived the decision that the fleet must winter in, or nigh, the Med.n; and upon this decision followed necessarily the obtaining of ports of refit.

Note Sequence

I am less sure of the accuracy of Marlboroughs conception of seizing Toulon. He had inherited the understanding of the need for a winter port; and for the present occasion a large operation in Southern France would undoubtedly be not only a powerful diversion but if it resulted in the fall and retention of Toulon would not only supply the needed base but be a crushing blow to France. Obviously, however, France not only must regain Toulon but in all probability could do so by land force. There was no sea danger; and if the condition of works was such as Vauban

Corbett's England in Med.

Capture by what was a coup de main by an invading army, still more could they be retaken by an army after nation affected. A siege of powerful works had to be protracted. If under such conditions France was powerless to raise the siege, she would equally be unable to besiege; but a capture by hasty assault could be retrieved.

Toulon in 1793 was lost and re-gained for these very causes; and while undoubtedly there will be room for difference as to how far the cases are parallel, there were, in 1793 abundant forces, land and sea, at hand to maintain possession.

In any event France could not but insist on the restoration of the port at a peace. To yield it would be to sink to a second rate state.

I am, however, much impressed by the fact that in the last analysis the relation of the War after Spanish Succ. to subsequent history was that of establishing the bases of operations; the relation which such establishment has to the operations themselves, in a total war

Work

War of Spanish Succession

The effect of the War of the Spanish Succn was to advance the frontier of Great Britain & the Medn, & its western basin from Gibraltar to Spain, with all the influence which such nearness exerted upon the surrounding shores.

The British frontier was also brought thus much nearer to those of Turkey

It also was placed on the flank of all sea communications from all seaports on those shores; whether those communications were with the Levant or with the Atlantic

The War of the League of Augsburg brought out in strong relief the necessity for Great Britain to check France on her Medn seaboard, and in adjacent Italy and Spain; and not only in the Channel and Atlantic. The direct corollary of this was Medn ports as a basis of fleet

Apply to Far Eastern Question & Philippines

This understanding, not reached before this war, was fully gained during it, and consequently formed a clearly apprehended motive of seaboard action in the War of the Spanish Succn

In this war the bases were obtained; and with them a naval and military position of advantage for the great wars of 1739–83. Let it not however be overlooked that Minorca

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Darcy

Navies as Indications of National Development

A navy is the luxury of successful countries. So long as a nation has not consolidated its unity, so long as it is traversing that period of growth which precedes its natural development, all its resources are not too much for employment upon its own territory. This is why England could not lay the foundations of her colonial empire until after her union with Scotland. This is the reason that the French navy dates from Louis XIV, and that of Germany from the constitution of the Empire. But when a nation possesses in itself that need of expansion which is the vital spring of the life of peoples, it seeks to substitute periods of wealth for periods of heroism, as soon as it has reached its natural frontiers. Having formed fully, it wishes to grow rich; and it demands in colonies and over sea commerce outlets for its surplus of activity

Then appears the navy — and External policy overseas.

Darcy p. 421

The above applies to the United States also. Not till after the Exaggerated period of States Rights had been definitely left behind did the nation reach out beyond the sea.

Then the navy appeared

Proper Method of Military Study is History

The study of military questions is relatively recent. It is posterior to the institution of standing armies, and dates only from the epoch in which the first military schools were founded.

The modes, or methods, of instruction which have been followed can be reduced to three:

1. The rational, so called, claims to base study upon logic and good sense.

2. The second sees in war an exact science.

3. The third seeks its indications in history.

Davbey Preface p. x

Davbey adheres to the historical method, the study of history. This, being the record of experience, if exhaustively studied brings out all the various factors which enter war because history, however imperfect, forgets none of them. History is photographic, the rational processes tend to be selective and in resting upon reason take too little account of the irrational factors, the surprises, mistakes, carelessness which affect war.

Read in this connection my comments in Nav. Hist. Preface.

Davbey continues accurately: The scientific method grows in favor during long periods of peace because, for a long while, men have ceased to have examples under their eyes. War then tends to take on

a conventional aspect. It is no longer seen as it is, but as it is conceived to be; that is, disengaged from reflexaction, and independent of all the elements which modify its aspect each passing moment

Darley p. xi

Criticism of Bruix

If Bruix had profited by the two occasions on which he met the enemy to win an easy victory, his cruise would appear as one of the best conceived of strategic operations. Executed as it was, we fail to understand it. For three months the cards were shuffled; the forecasts of the Admiralty shattered; then, little by little each party found itself again in the same position, or one equivalent (same relative pos^{n})

And thus it will always be when the equilibrium of forces is not in some degree disturbed

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Deduction from Bruix to Present & Past Conditions

The unwillingness of the British Govt., in 1799, to detach to the Med^{n}, after Bruix had brought the Fr. & Sp. fleets to Brest, needs to be coupled with the constant feeling in 1689-97, and 1702-14 of the need to protect Br. shores; of near home interests

Similarly now, the centre of interest seems to have shifted from Med^{n} to North Sea, under existing political conditions — German Navy

Concentration or Concentrate

In the Anglo Dutch wars, the necessity to concentrate the fleets (in order to establish by battle the control of the sea) was not at once evident. The solution of the problems of war is much more the fruit of experience than the result of reasoned calculation [This is in line with my comment upon William III's recognition of necessity of Br. fleet remaining in Med., & consequent need of ports. Also, it bears upon Darbey's preference for historical teaching, present or remote, over the deductions of a priori reasoning pp. x, xi. Note]

Accordingly, during the first war, other systems than concentration were tried [Experiments with] such as the direct protection of commerce [by convoying ships] and the direct attack of that of the enemy. But the danger of this line of action was soon seen, and with the second war the concentrations were absolute

Nevertheless, mere concentration does not lead to results, if it effect only an equality with the enemy. In such case, injury bends the equal, and the resulting condition is also equal

Hence arises the aim of strategy, to Effect a superiority of force by a greater wisdom, or rapidity of movement.

pp 29, 30

Note. Recall my position as to Atlantic & Pacific fleets; and illustrate

Dawkins

The maritime defensive, under any point of view, offers nothing but drawbacks. One may be forced to undergo it, but cannot adopt it. Both sides must seek the offensive, but they will not do so upon the same plan.

Method Appropriate to the Weaker and Stronger Navies

The stronger will always seek to meet the different hostile squadrons, in order to destroy them before they can do injury. The weaker will first endeavor to elude contact, in order to bring about changed distribution of forces, and to create the occasion. Then, he will try to draw his enemy to a favorable field of battle where his weaker unities can come into play. So long as the joust continues, so long as a decisive battle shall not have inclined the balance, the two sides will lay aside the associations which have provoked the war [will disregard the object in favor of the objective] For it is the field of battle which will decide the issue of the associations

Which will be victor? The most active, the most skilful, the most tenacious; the one possessing the character of force best adapted to the requirements of war

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The mere fact of having placed an enemy in an unforeseen situation puts him in a condition of inferiority and prevents him from recovering himself; while, on the other hand, one has succeeded in giving one's own forces the best utilization

The characteristic of the offensive is that of imposing battle instead of accepting it.

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This applies when original inferiority is not too great as in Russo Jap War Mahan

Instead of bringing the Toulon Fleet to Brest, in the days of Louis XIV and XV, it is the opinion of Dawkins that Concentration would have been effected more logically by sending the Brest fleet (the stronger) to Sp. at the time that the Toulon was accustomed to sail; that is, a little before the opening of the Campaign, in March or April. The Brest would pass the Straits, unite with the Toulon, and then proceed to Nl. The worst that cd happen would be pursuit by English, but it is better to retire before the danger than to run in its way.

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This would resemble an army abandoning its resources, in place of one holding its ground and rec? reinforcts Evidently, the choice of methods depends upon the other conditions, in each several case

England in Mediterranean

I will try here to summarize and co-ordinate my impressions derived from first hundred pages of Corbett.

Until the year 1600, and somewhat later, the military navies of the Med.n were galleys. Somewhere in the first decade of 17th Century an English adventurer, named Ward, ran away with a ship from the Eng Channel, and made his way to Tunis, where he entered the service of the Bey seizing his sailing vessel and others taken by him as corsairs. From this beginning the Barbary corsairs ceased to be galleys and became broadside sailing ships.

About the same time the same lesson was taught Algeria by one Dansyn.

The superiority of these cruisers & the galleys for operations in heavy & even ordinary weather made the Barbary corsairs military masters of the Med.n Spanish commerce and Spanish shores — including Naples, Sicily, Sardinia were at their mercy.

At this time, 1610, the Duke of Ossuna was made Viceroy of Sicily. Having served in the Netherlands, he had come in contact with the sailing navies of the North; had also visited England, and become convinced of the importance of Sea Power, and of the necessi

superiority of sailing vessels over galleys for existing it

Accordingly, Spain began to reconstruct the naval force at his command; transforming it into a sailing force, to cope with the Barbary States, and in measure with Turkey. He then entered into a contest the aim of which was to establish Spanish control from the straits at least as far as the Greek peninsula; thus insuring the coasts and commerce.

This period coincided with and followed the peace — a truce — between Spain and the Netherlands. It also embraced the political changes and combinations which led up to the Thirty Years War — which began 1618-9

The contending political aspect of this war was the probability of combined action between the two branches of the House of Austria, in Germany and in Spain. Communication between these could be only through the Med.n, because the fleets of the Protestant Powers — chiefly, if not wholly England and the United Provinces — controlled the Ocean routes.

The Mediterranean communications would be by Genoa under Spanish control, and by Lombardy (Milan) also Spanish. The Adriatic was also a line, but it was then dominated by Venice, which was likely

to be opposed to Spain — was so opposed in the Event.

The Spanish Milan therefore had on either side, contiguous, states the hostility of which was menacing: Savoy (Piedmont) on the West, the continental territory of Venice on the East. Savoy bore also on Genoa by its neighborhood, and intrinsically superior local power.

These considerations made Genoa and Venice the important points of commanding strategic interest on the lines joining the Hapsburgs of Spain & the same family in Germany

It follows that control of the Med.n was essential to support Genoa, to neutralize or overcome Venice, and so to keep the communications clear to Germany.

But in the now demonstrated superiority of the sailing fleet over the galley fleet, the existing sea power of the Northern States being wholly in sailing vessels was evidently able to control the communications, unless and until the Spanish navy in its various local divisions was reconstituted on this modern basis.

This series of considerations led to

the intervention of the Northern Sea Powers in the Med.n This took place, not by direct national action, but indirectly; by the Venetian Government hiring Dutch and British fleets of armed merchantmen to support their position in the Adriatic. By the international law of the day these subsidized forces, above were hostile to Spain; the two governments while permitting this employment remained (officially) neutral.

Both British and Dutch — the latter more especially — sent national squadrons into the Med.n; but they did so under the pretext of safeguarding trade against the Barbary states; Beyond this actually they did not go at this time. Indeed, on one occasion the Dutch navy was present while the Dutch squadron hired by France was in actual battle with the Spanish fleet near Gibraltar and did not aid their countrymen — who for the time were Venetian auxiliaries

The years 1625–1648 were years of the Thirty Years War. They were also years of Charles I's reign, with its civil discord, and paralysis for external movement. They were years of Richelieu (died, 1639) and of Mazarin in which France was exposed to the Hapsburgs. In these

Daveny, H

Instance of Concentration

D. states from a French source, (Report of D'Estrées) that in 1672 the junction of the British and French fleets was effected in the manner of preceding page. (17)

Illustrates Geography Effect on Strategy

Ruyter tried to intercept junction by taking position in Straits of Dover. The D. of York put to sea hurriedly from the Thames, passed the Ds first, and fell down Channel till the junction was effected at the spot designated. Then the Combined fleet again moved E, & called the Br ships which had been left behind because not ready

Ol + Nor

Evidently a special case; probably of Br. inferiority & Ruyter alone

years Richelieu was nursing up the French Navy, and had transferred it in part to the Med.n Mazarin, succeeding became increasingly aware of the importance of Sea Power upon the strife because of the strategic conditions which focussed from Catalonia to the head of the Adriatic, and have been noted after successful operations on the Catalonian coast, in which the Duc de Brézé showed ability Mazarin formulated and pursued the policy of establishing France's territorial basis of Sea Power by conquering Spanish Tuscan ports, and further by acquiring the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily for a French Prince. A certain measure of success was attained, but it stopped short of Naples, and the paralyzing struggle with the Fronde coincided with the early years of the Commonwealth, of Cromwell's strong arm, and of the release of the Dutch sea power by the ending of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia.

France remained at War with Spain, and embarrassed by the Fronde. Mazarin in common with most Continental Governments was strongly inimical to a regicide Republic. Spain openly so at heart, and Portugal, which had regained her independence in 1640.

The statesmanship was that these three

essentially continental states, with unimportant navies, were in a kind of interstatal stupe. The two Northern Republics, with powerful navies, though themselves rivals, were in a position to hold a balance; to play off the one state against the other. The fear of the navies entering the Med.n on one side, kept Spain and France [illegible] apprehension lest it should be against her. As time passed, the English Navy became the weightier consideration, because, with the strong military cast of the Govt, it became a more efficient body.

At this period the Br. Govt finally broke with the tradition of relying upon merchant vessels to constitute the armed shipping and developed a regular naval force. The strategic and tactical development passed under the control of army men; the significant feature in which was the subsumption of the mere seaman by the military officer — who became the modern naval officer; a seaman, yes; but primarily a combatant.

Depending upon Corbett, the significance of Blake's entry into the Med.n, being in pursuit of Rupert, seems to have been that it compelled attention to the large field for decisive military pressure then existing. Mazarin had realized this in measure; because

the actual conditions and course of the War (30 yrs) had forced him & realize (1) the value of Sea Power & himself and thence (2) the danger from English Sea Power. The English, previously absorbed in the Civil War, were roused & attention by the nervousness manifest in their possible enemies.

But this "lead," by inference from the enemy's hand and play, lead & contend with a tradition of commerce destroying war in the West Indies and Atlantic. This conservative force was supported further by the preoccupations of the time, and by the increasing animosity between the English and Dutch respectively, dependent upon trade interests. The attack and defence of commerce, and the rejoicing national hatred, tended & fasten attention on the Narrow Seas and neighboring coasts. Of these features the acquisition and loss of Dunkirk was an expression.

Nevertheless, the ~~value of~~ diplomatic and military value of Sea power in the Med. was now perceived, and the facility for entering in a powerful navy appreciated.

The first Navigation Act was Oct, 1651

June 30, 1652 the First Dutch War began formally, the Dutch envoys there leaving London, after the failure of negotiations. There had, however, already been a collision of fleets in the Channel.

The Dutch War had several causes. Among them was the searching Dutch vessels for French goods, during the period when reprisals had been ordered on French shipping because of French injuries to British commerce. Also, a British admiral had seized a large number of Dutch vessels in W.I. because of violation of Act of Oct. 1650, forbidding trade with Br. Colonies.

The British had the best of the war, but the effect was to drain the Br. naval force out of the Med. It may be that we here have a reflex action. That is, that there being an approximate equality between the two navies, the Dutch containing a much superior force in the Med. were thereby weakened in home waters. The project of the Br. to reinforce the Med. squadron, after Blake's first victory, led to the assignment of a force from his fleet for the Med. This detachment caused Blake's defeat by Tromp; after which the orders were countermanded and the detachment rejoined the fleet. With this concentration Blake defeated Tromp. The project of a detachment to Med. was then revived, but Monk, who had now joined the

England (not) in Med^n 1653

Corbett

many, opposed. "The pressing need of the moment before any real use could be made of the Med^n, was to crush the Dutch sea power, and the way to do it was to concentrate every available ship upon their main fleet and on the Converging points of the Commerce on which their national vitality depended." p. 270

Two more great battles, Two Days & Four Days, followed; "but, even though victorious, so desperate had been the fight, the English admiral had been unable to establish a working Command of the sea, and it was impossible to spare a Sq^n for Med^n. There the Dutch had to be left in undisputed control" 270

Peace in the spring of 1654. The Dutch Sea Power was not entirely crushed, but a real maritime supremacy had been gained for England. This left her free to pursue her interrupted policy within the Straits

Note

The above is another illustration of Atlantic and Pac. fleets; also of Rojdestvensky. Concentration in one quarter prevailed over division between two (Channel and Med^n) Consequent victory in our favor control of both

There is an analogous situation of the French Navy between Atlantic & Med^n Mp 254-6

The effect of the English fleet in the Med^n after the First Dutch War lay (1) in its superior force and mobility, enabling it to threaten every port with attack or blockade, and (2) especially to interrupt communications vital to Spain, and scarcely less essential to the more aggressive policy of Mazarin.

These two factors therefore both feared and courted England because of the effect the English fleet would exercise by joining the one or other.

Between the two Cromwell played a double game, partly from real dissimulation, partly because his policy was uncertain and contingent upon the attitude of the other states; i.e. the concession either might be willing to yield as the price of alliance, — or cooperation.

The result was the maintenance of an English fleet in the Med^n or near the Straits throughout Cromwell's adm^n; but in its last year or two his policy became more definitely adverse to Spain, and its general purpose is accurately indicated by the ultimate conclusion to obtain Dunkirk with its entrance into the Channel, and facility thereby of cooperating with North Protestant powers, rather than Gibraltar.

The prevailing feature of these years therefore was rather an increasing demoralization, and consequent recognition of the diplomatic and military

significance of a great preponderating fleet in the Medn., especially if strongly based there. This, rather than any decisive advance by England in her ship there, is the note of Cromwells action. The influence of Sea Power on current events was frequently manifested; but it was a current influence, and lacked as yet that element of permanence which fixed territorial establishments, ultimately effected at Gibraltar, Mahon, Tangier, Malta &c would give. In short the policy was developing, in its age and in a general apprehension, but had not yet taken form and hardened

N.B Note. That pressure on Spain in her Netherlands did not effect her policy as did that on her Medn. comms, because too distant and less vital. It resembles in this the attempt to affect China by operations on Formosa

"The Spanish Court had always shewn itself as indifferent to pressure in the Low Countries as it was nervous about the command of the Medn. In the old war no amount of harrying of her Ocean Commerce had served to bring Spain on her knees, but the same kind of danger in the Medn was another matter" p. 341

The Quebec operations belonging chiefly to Tactics, I don't know that it is worth my while to place down the impression received, but it is as follows (from Corbett)

Montcalm, facing the west on north bank his left rested on the Montmorenci, his right on the St Lawrence, above Quebec. His centre therefore may be considered Quebec itself and a certain stretch on either side. The Town stood steadily on the defensive; it was essential therefore to mislead and harass them as to entail such dispersion of their force as would present a point of entry and attack.

Wolfe's plan was to turn the right, by outflanking on the upper Montmorenci, or by forcing a passage of the lower. All failed. Then diversions above the town were initiated by means of the fireships &c, with troops. These became possible only after batteries on Pt Levis and vicinity had dominated Montcalm's fire on other side. These diversions had no effected in loosening Montcalm's hold around Beauport and Montmorenci, which both he and Wolfe regarded as the natural point of attack — decisive point; but they gradually took the form and value of attack on the French Communications

Callwell, and I think Corbett also, challenge my position as regards the action of Galissonière at Minorca. My principle is stated (p. 288 S.P.) without exception "in all occasions". Perhaps the qualification, that there are exceptions to all rules, should be observed; but I own to being not yet convinced as to the propriety either of Galissonière's strategy or Byng's tactics

With regard to the Seven Years War I must set down my Summary of the Diplomatic considerations before them. Again Condensed from Corbett.

The particular questions in dispute were American, and the wish of G.B. was to capture the Continent, and war if it came to be on the American field; with the general conditions of which I am sufficiently acquainted

France being distinctly the weaker, at once locally in America and on the sea, was compelled to seek counter weight on the continent, where Hanover was the British interest most open to assault. The tradition of the past made Prussia, the ally of France — as against the old hereditary enemy, Austria. The friendship between the two former was essentially dependent on their common enemy.

Prussia then might be feared as an enemy so preponderant in strength to Hanover, and so near at hand as, in conjunction with France to assure Hanover and the Austrian Netherlands, possibly Holland also, passing into control hostile to Great Britain; a result which would more than compensate any advantage gained in America, and would compel restitution of such gains

at the end of the war.

Then, as now, the whole system of colonial defence rested upon the mother country, the British Islands. Consequently, each results in the Netherlands and Holland menaced not only G. B. but the Colonies as well.

To assure quiet in Northern Europe, especially with Germany, was therefore necessarily an aim of British negotiation. Under Queen Anne & George II, in person, a treaty with Russia a subsidy treaty, the return for which was the maintenance of a Russian army in Livonia, threatening Prussia

When Fred K. got wind of this, he began to reach out toward the Br. Govt., with the result that the latter informed him that all they wished was the maintenance of neutrality in N. Europe — the maintenance of peace — which they thought lay with him; and that they were willing to guarantee him Silesia, which won from Austria, concerning Russia, & made some other concession, if he would undertake the armed neutrality for North Germany Fred K. then asked to see the existing Treaty between Great Britain and Russia

and as soon as he knew its terms entered into the desired arrangement

The treaty between G. B. and Russia, however, had contained a clause by which the Navy Entered into ~~negotiations~~ an agreement that neither should open such negotiations with Prussia, without informing the other. The whole arrangement with Fred K was made in Russia's ignorance; and when it became known the natural displeasure at such faithlessness was increased by the Czarina Elizabeth's personal hatred for Fred K

This gave Austria the opportunity for a great combination against Fred K, in regard of which she hoped to regain Silesia Hence arose the alliance of France, Austria & Russia against Prussia, and Hanover, as representing a British interest; and thereby came into being the Continental War, by the course of which France and England hoped the one to regain losses in America, the other to direct that war as to leave her free hand in the New World, and to keep whatever gains she there might make

growing more and more serious; and as the British strength there developed, and the threat more multiform, Montcalm was forced to increase the mobile force, in order to provide as far as possible against all contingencies.

Wolfe's primary grounds were formulated the conception that an attack on the enemy's left flank, up river, should supersede the direction against his right; the more so, because this also threatened the French communications & interposed between Montcalm & reinforcements. It is to be noted that, in thus passing above the British also in measure exposed theirs, in the attempt to strike the enemy — a common embarrassment. But the British control of the water & facility for passing from side to side, more than compensated for this disadvantage.

The effect upon the French, being on defensive, & therefore ignorant where the attack might fall, was that they had to stretch their line, with a greatly impaired power of movement by which to correct mistakes. The mistake must be

to be the impending, a insufficient guard of some practicable entrance (breach) This is what happened; and Wolfe recognizing by reconnoissance that the path by which he mounted was in fact inadequately guarded attacked there, and succeeded in passing his army through the enemy's center and massing it there before the Islands could come to its support.

This attack at the center Corbett says was Wolfe's own design, contrary to the opinion and even remonstrance of his juniors

Aug 10 — Goeben reported to have entered Adriatic; will be a valuable reinf.t to Aust.n Navy

German submarine reported sunk in attack upon Br. Cruiser Sqdn., Ch. rec.d no damage

" 12 — Notif.n by Italy that harbors of Spezia, Ancona, Taranto and Venice are mined

Several Greek & Ital.n ships carrying coal to Italy stopped by Br. & Fr. cruisers, but allowed to proceed

(Suggests to Italy what she has to expect if war with maritime powers)

" Fr. Aust.l Cruisers ships have joined Br. Sqdn in East Asiatic waters

Fr. Cruiser captures two German ships near Shanghai

" Advs from Athens that Goeben was seen proceeding in direction of Dardanelles. Thought that Breslau also and that they will there be interned. Made Routes secure

(She ought to have joined Aust.ns)

" Reported that Export route for provs to Germ. & Denmark & England reopened

" U.S. to protest against reported placing of Contact mines in North Sea by Germans. G.B. hold hurney at full

Aug 12 liberty to adopt similar measures if Germany does.

This will be disregard both of Hague as to automatic mines, (and executive plea in behalf of Orders in Council of 1807)

Hague Rules

Aug 12 N.Y. Herald Forbidden (1) To lay (unanchored) automatic contact mines except when will become harmless one hour after person laying them ceases to control them

(2) To lay anchored do wh. do not become harmless when they break loose

(3) To use torpedoes wh. do not become harmless after missing mark

(4) To lay auto contact off coasts & ports of Enemy with sole view to stop Commercial shipping

(5) Every precaution to be taken to secure peaceful shipping

(Will the belligerents observe rules?)

Aug 12 Despatch fr. St. Petersburg says Russian ships activity covering Baltic. 20 Capt. merchantmen taken into Swinemunde

(Does this signify G. fleet at Elbe end of Canal?)

" Rumors of Br. & G. war ships in Pac. off California

" Br. Suffolk & Essex reported off N.Y., and Manchester (Displacement 9.800, fourteen 6") N.Y. Herald

Aug. 13 Goeben reported sold to Turkey. (May this be to strengthen Turks against Greeks?) (Her most faithful course wd. be here to join Austrns.) N.Y. Times

Goeben N.B G.B. has seized for own use Turkish ship bldg. in Eng. Dread. Osman I N.Y. Times

Aug 13 A'Court Repington thinks Gt. may strike by sea at same time as by land. (Moves goes less now; but on other hand what effect can defeat of Br. fleet have affecting war on land?) (But defeat of Br. H. wd. stop reinfts for Cont.

Repington

Comm'd. Rumors Br. Admty guarantees safety of N. Atlantic, but can give no assurance as to North Sea because of German mines

"Enemy (Gn.) ships will be hunted continually) N.Y. Times

Aug 13 Philadelphia stopped by Fr. torpedo boat in Channel, and by Br. Suffolk near Sandy Hk

Aug 13 Admt Cradock reports N. Atl clear of Gn. Crs

Cradock Cradock's sq'n: Suffolk (flag) Berwick, Bristol Lancaster, Essex. Sister ships County class

Aug 21

Aug. 20 Br. Embassy at Wash^{n}. rec^{d} summary of A & N. Ops^{n} to date:

"Since Decl^{n} War fleet has been responsible for safety of Exped^{y} force, wh complet^{d} disemb^{n} in 7^{d} Aug 18, in perfect order & without casualty

"Work of many elsewhere best shown by fact that Lloyd's rates fell to 40^{s} p.c for almost all voyages of Br. vess

"German fleet outside Baltic confined to harbours. Eng commerce almost normal. German commerce by sea paralyzed

"Amphion only casualty. One Ger^{n} submarine sunk in North Sea N. Y. Times Aug 21.

Continuation of Above

Aug 20

"The military position is as follows:

"The German forces at present extend from north of the neighborhood of Basle, through Liege, to a point in Belgium to the east of Antwerp and near the Dutch frontier. Outstanding features of the operations up to the present have been the delay caused to the contemplated German offensive across the Meuse by the defense of Liege, where the forts are still intact. It has permitted the orderly mobilization and concentration of the French army and the British expeditionary force. German troops have now crossed the Meuse both above and below Liege and are gaining some ground slowly westward, but their advance cavalry has been continually checked by the Belgians.

"In the south, where the German armies are apparently on the defensive, the French are advancing on a long line into Alsace and Lorraine, a great extent of which they now occupy after driving back in several engagements the troops opposed to them."

Aug 21 Steam Florizel from Halifax & N.Y. reports spoken by Mr. Cr. "Suffolk" off Fire Island

Times Aug 21

RUSSIAN PORTS SHELLED.

German Fleet Said to Have Bombarded Kronstadt, Viborg and Reval.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, Aug. 20.—Nothing of importance had been heard of the operations of the German fleet in the Baltic since the beginning of the war and the reported occupation of the Aland Islands by the Germans.

An English engineer who has just arrived back from St. Petersburg, and who is a competent authority on naval and military matters, reports that when he left the Russian capital seven days after the declaration of war ships of the German squadron were bombarding Kronstadt, Viborg and Reval.

This is very important information, because Kronstadt is the famous fortress and naval base at the approach to St. Petersburg. Reval is the great naval base at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and a place where large sums of money have been expended in forming docks and providing for all the requirements of an important naval establishment, while Viborg is a considerable port in Finland, not far from the Russian frontier and St. Petersburg.

Capt. Charles Mourrand of the France, which brought 543 first, 384 second, and 447 third class passengers from Havre, gave some interesting details of the English troops' landing in France:

"On Aug. 14 the day we left Havre," said he, "at 4 o'clock 35,000 British soldiers landed there from twenty transports with their artillery, stores, and ammunition without any mishap. It was all done so quietly that no one in Havre except the military officials and the naval commandant of the port knew that the English were coming.

Landing of the British.

"Just after daylight the transports entered the harbor in single file and were warped through the dock gates to the various basins where they were to land. Each vessel had a big number painted on the hull amidships and had its particular quay marked on the plan made by the commandant. The officers and soldiers were all dressed in khaki uniforms and carried their kits in marching order, and were a fine looking lot of men.

"The people of Havre gave them a hearty welcome as they marched through the streets with the bands playing the "Marseillaise," and English, Scotch, and Irish music."

Capt. Mourrand added that he did not know where the troops went when they left Havre as all movements of the French Army and the allies were kept secret.

The France was stopped at the mouth of the Channel by French torpedo boats and spoke from English warships on the way across the Atlantic. The last one was sighted at noon yesterday east of Fire Island, and asked the France to hoist her colors and official number, which was complied with, and then the warship replied with answering pennant, "All right."

ALLIES CONTROL SEAS.

Britain Declares Germany's Trade Has Been Destroyed.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22.—That Great Britain and France now control the seas in all parts of the world and that 7 per cent. of the German shipping is now in British hands are statements contained in an official announcement given out at the British Embassy to-night, being a resume of the naval situation prepared by the Government in London. The statement follows:

"The floating trade of Germany has been brought to a standstill by the operations of the British cruisers in the different parts of the world. The German fleet is unable to interfere or to set their commerce free owing to the British main fleet, which is cruising in full strength and preventing any interference with the cruisers.

"Already about 7 per cent. of the total German tonnage is in British hands, another 20 per cent. is sheltering in neutral harbors and the remainder is either in German harbors unable to move or endeavoring to find security. British shipping with the exception of less than 1 per cent., which was in German harbors at the outbreak of war, is actively pursuing its business on all the great commercial routes.

"The German squadron in China has been rendered ineffective by the constant pursuit by the British squadron in the Far East. Trade in China is therefore unaffected.

"The Austrian squadron in the Adriatic has retired into the Adriatic before the Anglo-French fleet, which is so superior that it is able to send strong detachments to any parts of the Mediterranean or adjoining seas in which naval forces may be required.

"Great numbers of the seafaring population of Great Britain are offering themselves for service in the fleet."